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Abstract 
The present paper draws heavily on the existing empirical literature and compares Asian 
(mainly the high-performing economies) and African economies to illuminate the patterns 
of economic development as they developed since the 1960s. The discussion points to 
strong physical and human capital accumulation as well as pro-export policies, international 
favorable attitude and social capital as main reasons behind the HPAEs‘ successful 
development. Quite the opposite, SSA have found itself trapped into economic stagnation 
since the mid-1970s and culminated in steadily declining living standards. The extent of the 
Asian–African divergence can also be found in agriculture productivity, manufacturing 
growth and exports. The paper concludes with distinctive patterns of the two regions‘ 
development, respectively termed as a ―self-consistent development model‖ for the HPAEs, 
in opposition to the Africa pattern: the ―inconsistent development model‖. Furthermore, the 
paper argues that the inference that the Africa could duplicate the East Asian experience is 
largely not relevant. 
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 I. Introduction  
In The Theory of Economic Development (1955), W.A. Lewis asserted that because 
Japan doubled its per capita output in 25 years, the potential was there for the rest of Asia 
and Africa to emulate Japan and achieve similar records (p.316). However that early 
optimism on the prospect of economic development in Africa and Asia turned into an 
extraordinary success story in Asia while becoming a development disappointment in 
Africa, thus confirming the early prediction by Rene Dumont (1966), the French 
agronomist, who bluntly told the world the so-called development decade of the 1960s was 
no more than a ―false start in Africa‖ insofar as the priorities set were wrong.  
The economic stagnation in Africa throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s 
culminated in steadily declining living standards, general political crises, and ethnic 
conflicts in a number of African countries. Related to the economic decline, population 
explosion and environmental deterioration reflected additional dimensions of the African 
development crisis that were in direct contradiction to the East Asia miracle celebrated as 
the template model from which imitation became the recommended magic potion.  
Starting from quite similar per capita income in the early 1960s, Sub-Saharan Africa‘s 
1997 GDP per capita was US$560 as compared to average per capita income of US$4,230 
for Latin America, $750 for China, and $24,710 for the industrialized world. Over the 
period 1965–89, real GDP per capita annual growth of the Sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter 
SSA) averaged less than 0.5% compared to over 5% for the high-performing Asian 
economies (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and 
Thailand) (World Bank, 1991). The East Asian Miracle Report (World Bank, 1993) offered 
a number of reasons for such growth, in particular high savings and investment rates; a 
relatively high degree of equality; high growth rates of human and physical capital; high 
productivity growth (including agriculture), and high growth rates of manufactured exports.  
In attempts to reverse the development disaster and re-set the continent on a growth 
path similar to that of the Asian economies, several reform programs were implemented 
over SSA since the early 1980s. The crisis in African economies especially over the past 
two decades and the ascendance of neoclassical economics resulted in a shift in 
development thinking particularly among powerful multilateral financial institutions (MFls). 
Aiming at resuming economic growth and promoting export-oriented development, 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) were implemented in almost all African countries 
at various times since the early 1980s. 
However, the outcomes of the SAPs‘ decade (1980s) have been disappointing both in 
terms of economic growth and global market integration. In the meantime, Africa‘s share of 
world exports has declined, its exports merely concentrated in primary commodities, thus 
further accelerating Africa‘s economic marginalization.  
The first obvious question is what is it about sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) which explains 
its performance being so different from Asia? Are there any detectable economic 
development patterns? If so, is the economic development experience of South East Asia 
relevant for policy design by African governments? The paper addresses these questions 
from the standpoint that the origin of developmental differences between the two regions 
can be attributed to historical and institutional factors as well as to contrasting 
governmental strategies and the geopolitical environment of the Cold War. It also 
concludes with the inference that the fact the SSA could duplicate the East Asian 
experience is largely irrelevant.  
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For the simple reason that in development debates, East Asia is often seen as an 
undisputed success story, there has been a tendency to contrast Africa‘s growth "tragedy" 
over the last three decades with the economic "miracle" of East Asia. This paper aims at 
comparing Asian (mainly high-performing economies) and African economies to illuminate 
the patterns of economic development as they developed since the 1960s. The paper draws 
heavily on the existing empirical literature with a considerable amount of effort going into 
interpretation. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section two briefly reviews the two 
regions‘ economic development background and performance. Section three explains the 
underlying causes of economic development success or failure of the respective regions. 
Section four attempts to derive development patterns and eventually discusses their 
relevance for SSA. Finally, Section five concludes with brief prospects for SSA. 
II. Economic Background  
The section provides a brief overview of the two regions in terms of economic 
structure, development and trade performance. 
2.1. Overview of development performance in Asia and SSA 
At the time of their independence in the 1950s and 1960s, to a large extent, the quality 
of life in most of Asia was fairly comparable with that of Africa. However, unlike the Asian 
countries, the African countries had relatively large endowments of natural resources and 
hence were expected to encounter significantly higher rates of economic growth in the 
post-independence period.  
Yet shortly after independence, the Asian countries embarked on very successful 
human capital formation programs and, in addition, developed and implemented 
pro-growth policies that resulted in tremendous improvement in living standards across the 
region. In contrast, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa ended up being the poorest, most 
heavily indebted countries in the world. Poverty is still escalating while many African 
countries continue to spend more on debt repayments than they do on health care for their 
people. The debt crisis in the late 1970s prompted the private sector to cease lending to 
SSA countries by the beginning of the 1980s. The decade of the 1980s was a period of a 
hostile global environment for Africa as the industrialized Western countries began to 
resort to increasingly protectionist trade policies while the oil shocks induced recessions in 
their own economies. African nations soon faced rising OECD trade barriers in addition to 
declining living standards. 
A deep contrast exists in the overall performance of SSA and the high-performing 
Asian economies (hereafter HPAEs.). Average annual GDP growth rates for SSA were 
1.7% over 1980–90 and 2.1% over 1990–97, compared to figures of 7.8% and 9.9% for 
East Asia (World Bank, 1999). While much of the SSA growth was in agriculture, most 
East Asian growth was in industry. In SSA, real GDP growth has seen a general decline 
from about 3% in the late 1970s to about 1% in the following decade, recovering only 
slightly in the 1990s (Lawrence and Thirtle, 2001). GDP per capita has been declining since 
the early 1980s while the HPAEs have maintained positive per capita growth rates since the 
1960s (see Table 1).  
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Table 1: Growth in GDP Per Capita 
  1961-72 1973-80 1981-90 1986-96 
Africa 1.3 0.7 -0.9 -1.0 
East Asia 7.0 7.1 9.4  7.2 
South East Asia 3.2 4.9 4.3   
South Asia 1.3 1.6 3.3 2.9 
Source: World Bank, Economic and Social Data Base (2000) 
Most approaches to development assume that economic development generally consists 
of nations undergoing a series of structural transformations from less to more desirable, 
profitable, and value-added activities. In particular, these transformations include the 
change from less sophisticated to more sophisticated agricultural techniques, from an 
agricultural to a manufacturing to perhaps service economy, and from light to heavy to 
high-tech industries in post-agricultural economies (Clark and Roy, 1997). 
Table 2 presents structural characteristics of Asian and African economies in terms of 
the share of GDP contributed by the agricultural, manufacturing, and service sectors in the 
period 1990-2003.As can be seen, East Asia reduced in half the contribution of agriculture 
in its GDP from 25% to 14% while increasing its industry share. As a result, the fraction of 
the labor force devoted to agriculture declined significantly. It can also be observed that the 
reduction in the share of agriculture was accompanied by an increase in the share of 
industry, instead of services as in the South Asian case.  
 
Table 2. Economic structure in SSA and HPAEs 
 Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services 
 % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP 
     1990 2003 1990 2003 1990 2003 1990 2003 
East Asia & Pacific 25 14 40 49 30 36 35 36 
South Asia 31 22 27 26 17 16 43 51 
Sub-Saharan Africa 19 17 34 31 17 14 47 52 
Source: World Bank, 2005 
Unlike East Asia, SSA‘s contribution of agriculture to GDP has not changed 
significantly, while its share of industry (and manufacturing) has even declined compared 
to its 1990 level. Note that East Asian structural change has followed the following path: 
starting from an agricultural base, these economies expanded relatively rapidly into such 
light industries as textiles and clothing, and even more rapidly into heavy industries such as 
steel, shipbuilding, automobile manufacture, to end up in electronics. Structural 
transformation was sustained and rapid in Asia, whose manufacturing exports jumped from 
22% of merchandise exports in 1963 to 87% in 2000 while SSA experienced only a slight 
move from 7% to 20% in the same period (Table 3).  
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Table 3. South East Asia: Manufactures exports 
(average % of merchandise exports) 
 1963 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Asia 22 25 49 69 87 
SSA 7 6 9 19 20 
Data source: World bank, WDI, 2004. 
Development economic theorists agree that countries achieve rapid nonagricultural 
growth only after rapid growth in agriculture is completed. Further agriculture represents a 
key sector in the process of the African economic transformation, so it is worth noting that 
agriculture performance in SSA has been disappointing in regard to the potential of the 
continent. Less than 7% of the cropped area in Africa is irrigated, and the use of purchased 
inputs and machines is very limited. Cereal yields (a reflection of the productivity of land 
under cereal production) are less than half those in other developing regions. Indeed, since 
the 1960s, the level of public resources allocated to agriculture has been consistently low 
relative to the sector‘s size and contribution to the economy. In most African countries, the 
sector receives less than 10% of public (recurrent and investment) spending, but accounts 
for 30–80% of gross domestic output (World Bank, 2000). 
2.2. Savings and Investment 
With an extremely low savings and investment rate since the 1960s, in addition to 
narrow tax bases and weak tax-collecting capacity, African governments have been overly 
dependent on taxes on international trade transactions for their fiscal revenue. Savings rates 
nearly doubled in a handful of countries in East Asia, where they averaged almost 30% of 
disposable income between 1984 and 1993. SSAs‘ already modest savings rates fell to 
between 10 and 15% (World Bank. 1999).  
An interesting point about the performance of savings in Africa, in contrast with 
savings performance in the fast growing Asian economies during the reform period, is that 
changes in savings rates in Africa have been largely driven by the public sector (World 
Bank 1994), while in Asia, private savings usually drove them. As pictured in Figure 1, 
gross national savings in Africa dropped from 11.4% of disposable income in the 1970s to 
7.5% in the 1980s. By the mid-1990s it was still less than 9%. Public savings performed 
even worse, staying at under 3% of disposable income by the mid-1990s after falling from 
4.5% in the 1980s. In many of the African countries where savings rates declined, they did 
so because public savings declined faster Mwega (1997).  
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Figure 1: Gross national savings (GN Savings in % of GDP) 
and Investment (in % of GDP) in SSA 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2005 
Savings rates in Africa (16% of GDP in 1980-2004) have followed an erratic trend and 
remained lower than investment rates (19% of GDP in 1980-2004), which is in contrast 
with the bright picture from Asia (Figure 2) where savings and investment rates have been 
growing. On the average, savings and investment rates in Asia averaged 30% in the 
1980-2004 period. It is worth noting that Asia‘s savings rate has surpassed investment rates 
since the late 1990s. 
Figure 2. Gross national savings (GN Savings in % of GDP) and Investment (in % of 
GDP) in Asia 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2005 
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Table 4. Indicators of bank financial soundness in developing 
regions and European emerging markets, 2002-2004 
 Percentage 
 Return on assets Non-performing 
loans to 
total loans 
Regulatory 
capital to 
risk-weighted assets 
 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004  
Asia  0.8 1 1.5 12.7 11.2 10.1 14.5 15.2 14.8 
Latin America  -2.6 1 1.4 12.5 10.1 8.6 13.2 14.3 16.2 
Western Asia  1.1 1.3 ..  15.4 15.2 ..  15.6 15 ..  
Sub-Saharan 
Africa  
2.7 3 ..  19.9 17.3 ..  17.7 15.7 ..  
Emerging Europe  1.5 1.6 1.7 9.3 8 7.8 17.5 17.1 16 
Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report: Market Developments and Issues: April 2005 
Weaknesses in the banking system contributed to the poor performance of savings 
mobilization in Africa among others. In many African countries, the development of the 
financial sector has not advanced far beyond commercial banks. Financial soundness 
indicators (Table 4) on average point to solid rates of return on assets and sustained 
improvements in capital and asset quality. In Asia, banks‘ earnings, asset quality and 
capital adequacy have steadily improved since 2003. However, the region‘s ratio of 
non-performing loans (NPLs) to total assets, while declining, remains high; problem loans 
are especially prevalent at State-owned banks. Performance in banking systems in Africa 
has been more mixed. 
2.3. Capital Flows  
SSA has not been a major attraction for FDIs (except in oil exporting countries such as 
Angola and Nigeria) partly in response to the continent‘s high investment risk and the 
significant decline in the rate of investment return over the years. According to the World 
Bank (1988), rates of return in sub-Saharan Africa have dropped from around 30.7% in 
1961-1973 to around 2.5% in 1980-1987. On the other hand, during that period the rate of 
return in South Asia, for instance, grew from 21.3 to 22.4%. Asian countries experienced a 
significant growth in the inflows of private capital in the last decade with a surge in net FDI 
inflows representing 36% in 1997 and 42% in 2003 (Table 5). Among Asian economies, 
Malaysia, Thailand and Korea experienced (as a percentage of PPP GDP) the most 
significant growth in private capital flows between 1986 and 1996.  
Table 5. Evolution of Net FDI Inflows by Region (1997 – 2003, % of total) 
 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 
East Asia and Pacific 36.3 33.0 27.6 27.3 27.4 37.2 41.9 
Europe and Central Asia 13.5 14.8 15.5 18.0 18.3 22.3 19.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean 39.2 42.0 48.6 47.8 40.0 30.4 27.2 
Middle East and North Africa 3.5 4.0 1.7 1.2 3.4 2.0 1.5 
South Asia 2.9 2.3 1.7 1.9 2.9 2.7 3.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.7 4.0 5.0 3.7 8.0 5.4 6.6 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 2004. 
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Having benefited very little from the growth of private capital flows to the developing 
world in general in the 1990s, Africa has continuously had to use official development 
assistance to make up for the shortfall in resource flows. On a per capita basis of $40, 
currently Africa is the largest recipient of ODA among the developing regions of the world. 
There is every indication of decline as net ODA, which amounted to 10.7% of GNP in 1990, 
fell to 5% of GNP in 1997. Incidentally ODA amounted to less than 1% of GNP for East 
Asia and the Pacific, and only 0.8% for South Asia in 1997. While aid to most of Africa 
was increasing in the 1980s, it was understandably shrinking in the high-performing SE 
Asian economies.  
2.4. International Trade and Competitiveness 
In the 1950s and 1960s, both regions engaged in import-substitution industrialization 
(ISI), which paved the way for the subsequent economic performance in Asia. In SSA, the 
economic growth of the 1960s failed to translate into a virtuous growth process through 
complementary increases in domestic savings and exports (partly as a result of capital 
flight.) In SSA, ISI resulted in severe currency overvaluation which led to a black/parallel 
market for foreign exchange in most parts of SSA. Eventually there was not enough foreign 
exchange to import consumption goods or intermediate inputs, which greatly harmed export 
industries.   
The divergence in export performance between the two regions has become most 
pronounced for the period 1980-95, during which the role of rapid export growth in the 
industrialization of SE Asia is widely acknowledged (Harrold et.al. 1996). More 
specifically, Africa‘s share in world trade has been falling since 1980 from about 3.7% of 
world total exports in 1980 to 1.5% in 2002, and from 3.1% of world total imports in 1980 
to 1.4% in 2002 (Table 6). It is estimated that for SSA, the erosion of the world trade share 
between 1970 and 1993 has meant a loss of $68 billion or 21% of GDP (World Bank, 
1998).  
Table 6: Share of developing regions in world trade, 1980-2002 (percentages) 
Region 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 
 Exports 
SSA 3.7 2.5 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Developing Asia 17.9 15.6 16.9 21.6 24.3 23.7 23.3 
 Imports 
SSA 3.1 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.4 
Developing Asia 13.1 15.2 15.9 21.9 21.1 21.0 20.8 
Source: UNTCAD (2004) 
The developing countries of Asia have jumped from 18% of a world exports share in 
1980 to 23% in 2002, with similar performance in their imports share. In Korea, Thailand 
and Malaysia, the various indicators of trade integration suggest greater integration as these 
grew much faster than in any SSA country. For instance, trade as a percentage of GDP was 
as high as 70.2% in Malaysia in 1996 and only 21.5% and 20.7% in Nigeria and South 
Africa respectively, two of SSA‘s largest economies. 
What is indeed remarkable about the poor external performance of SSA economies is 
the fact that its competitiveness in world markets has been eroded in the last three decades. 
The export of traditional export commodities such as cocoa, coffee, rubber, spices, tin and 
tropical vegetable oils declined throughout the 1970s and 1980s. This happened at the same 
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time as Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand raised their shares in the export markets for the 
same items. While the export of primary commodities has declined in value for many SSA 
countries, they continue to dominate their external trade, accounting for 83% of all exports 
in 1970 and 76% in 1992 (See Table 7). Consequently, because the rate of growth in trade 
for manufacturing goods and services was much faster than that for primary commodities 
(twice for mining products and four times for agricultural products), Africa‘s overall share 
in world exports could not be maintained at its 1970s‘ level. 
Table 7: Structure of Merchandise Exports 
Country Merchandis
e Exports 
Fuels, 
Minerals and 
Metals 
Other primary 
Commodities 
Machinery & 
transport 
Equipment 
Other Manufactures Textile Fibres, 
textiles & Clothing 
% change % of Total % of Total % of Total % of Total % of Total 
1980-1995 1980 1993 1980 1993 1980 1993 1980 1993 1980 1993 
Cote d‘Ivoire  25 -- 15 -- 68 -- 2 -- 15 -- -- 
Ghana  -3 17 25 82 52 -- 0 1 23 0 -- 
Indonesia  107 76 32 22 15 1 5 2 48 1 17 
Kenya  50 36 16 52 66 1 2 12 17 3 3 
Korea  614 1 3 9 4 20 43 70 51 30 19 
Malaysia  469 35 14 46 21 12 41 8 24 3 6 
Nigeria  -55 97 94 2 4 0 0 0 2 -- -- 
Senegal  -28 39 25 46 54 3 2 12 19 3 4 
South Africa  9 33 16 28 11 4 8 36 66 4 3 
Thailand  768 14 2 58 26 6 28 22 45 10 15 
Uganda  34 1 -- 97 100 3 1 0 -- 2 -- 
Zimbabwe  33 23 16 39 48 2 3 36 34 1 11 
Source: World Bank, 1997: World Development Indicators. 
2.5. Human Capital Formation 
As to human capital accumulation, progress have been made since 1960, but still the 
region has moved far from East Asia, which has reduced in half the percentage of unschooled 
children from 52% in 1960 to 24% in 1990 and less than 15% in 2000. In sub-Saharan Africa, 
although by 1990 the situation had improved from 1960, the absolute number and the relative 
share of the unschooled increased in the last decade (see Table 8).  
Table 8:  Out-of School Children, Aged 6-11 (percent) 
 1960 1980 1990 
Region All Female All Female All Female 
Developing Countries 
Sub-Saharan Africa  
East Asia 
South Asia 
52 
75 
47 
56 
62 
82 
56 
71 
31 
43 
25 
40 
38 
49 
30 
53 
24 
50 
14 
27 
29 
54 
16 
28 
Source:  UNESCO 1993. 
Government spending on education and average years of education per adult over 25 
has been used as a measure of the stock of human capital (Roemer, 1994). In terms of 
government expenditure, African spending as a share of GDP has been declining over the 
years (except for Zimbabwe), whereas the opposite trend has been observed in Asia (Table 
9). For instance, starting with 27% of its budget allocated to primary education in 1970, 
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Benin ended up with 10% in 2000. A downward trend in public spending on education 
since the 1970s is a common feature among African countries. In contrast, an upward trend 
seems present in Asia. For instance, Thailand started with 8% in 1970 and reached 17% in 
2000.  
Despite progress in education and healthcare in Africa over the past half century, both 
the volume and quality of human capital are widely acknowledged as grossly insufficient to 
meet the challenges. Initially designed to meet the needs of colonial economies, the 
educational system throughout SSA did not promote technical and engineering fields as did 
Asia. In addition, the absence of compulsory education in most African countries is one of 
the causes of income disparity over the continent. Among the major achievements of South 
East Asia that Africa completely failed to meet is the relative equity in the distribution of 
income and wealth. This was a feature of most of the East Asian economies initially in the 
1960s, and was maintained in the 1970s and 1980s (World Bank, 1993).  
Table 9. Expenditure per student, primary (% of GDP per capita) in selected 
Asian and African countries (1970-2000) 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Benin 27.6  20.4  .. .. .. 11.6  9.8  
Botswana 15.7  9.4  .. 6.8  .. .. 6.0  
Congo, Rep. 14.2  10.0  .. .. .. 10.7  .. 
Gambia, The 24.8  25.7  18.4  15.0  13.1  13.5  .. 
Kenya .. .. .. 14.5  13.0  .. 0.9  
Korea, Rep. .. .. .. 13.6  12.0  17.4  18.4  
Lesotho 11.7  13.6  12.7  14.4  .. .. 21.4  
Malawi 17.5  8.2  7.0  7.6  6.5  8.2  .. 
Malaysia .. .. .. .. .. 8.3  12.9  
Mali .. 30.5  29.6  .. .. 13.3  .. 
Mauritania .. 43.4  28.8  .. 16.9  11.1  .. 
Philippines .. .. .. .. .. 9.0  12.7  
Thailand 8.0  9.9  8.8  .. 13.3  15.5  17.2  
Togo 11.4  .. 7.7  .. 8.3  7.1  11.0  
Zimbabwe 8.5  9.1  19.5  15.5  20.1  18.6  13.2  
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004. 
Because HPAEs surprised both scholars and practitioners of development field by 
miraculously emerging out of their initial under-development stage whereas SSA was 
collapsing, the obvious question to ask is what explains the divergent development 
performance of the two regions?   
III. Explaining the Asian Success and African Failures 
There is no generally accepted single explanation of why East Asian economies were so 
successful. However, from neo-classical and endogenous growth models as well as 
empirical investigation, there is general agreement on the list of features of these economies 
that contributed to their success. Most of the following development features have been 
often cited as being at the root of the Asia‘s success while their absence is thought to 
explain the African economic disaster (Morrissey and Nelson, 1998; World Bank, 1993): 
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 High rates of savings and investment to allow rapid physical capital accumulation and 
structural change; 
 Investment in education and training to support human capital accumulation and 
adoption of advanced technology for improving total factor productivity growth and 
agriculture sector productivity; 
 Careful fiscal and monetary policies to ensure macroeconomic stability and build up 
financial capital; 
 State role through appropriate institutions and skilled bureaucracy; 
 Relatively open trade policy and high growth rate of manufactured exports and 
diversification away from excessive reliance on primary commodities in order to build 
a broad and secure base for economic activity; 
 Relatively equitable income distribution so that there is some sharing of the benefits of 
growth; 
 Favorable international context (geopolitical and geographical factors) and external 
market accessible in terms of proximity and acceptance of massive foreign products. 
The following discussion will be focused on some of the above issues as bases for 
understanding the performance of the Asian economies and the failure of their African 
counterparts. 
3.1. Economic Structural Change 
East Asian countries began their growth spurts as labor-abundant, resource- and 
capital-poor countries and initially exported labor-intensive manufactured products. In all 
Asian countries, upgrading of technologies and products has moved in step with the 
accumulation of physical and human capital (Roemer, 1994). A number of the SE Asian 
economies managed to move from being primary export producers in the 1960s and 1970s 
to become major exporters of manufactured goods. In South East Asia, primary export 
earnings helped to finance the investment and imported inputs needed to industrialize. As a 
result, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand raised the share of manufactured exports from less 
than 6% in 1965 to 41%, 61% and 77% respectively in 1992. For the period of 1980-1995 
these three economies sustained an average growth rate of manufacturing exports in an 
impressive range of 9 - 13 % p.a. (Table 2). In contrast, the share of manufactured exports 
for SSA countries hardly changed: 7% in 1965 and 8% in 1990 (Aryeetey and Nissanke, 
1998). 
Countries such as Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, and Kenya invested productively in 
agriculture, but other African countries turned away from their primary export base. In 
contrast to Southeast Asia, foreign exchange shortages hampered industrialization efforts. 
Because protection and other policies insulated manufacturing from the disciplines of the 
markets, it was possible to start industries and employ technologies that were not always 
closely related to the resource and factor endowments in Africa. (Roemer, 1994).  
East Asian economies successfully undertook the transition from import-substitution 
to export-led industrialization between 1960-1975 when SSA was deeply entangled into ISI. 
What is noteworthy is that East Asia economies undertook the critical transition when the 
world economy was extremely conducive to trade and exports and, more importantly, when 
the international division of labor was experiencing a drastic shift. In a sense, East Asian 
economies were blessed by favorable timing and took full advantage of such opportunity 
for realizing their take-off. (Hsiao, 1993). For Korea and Taiwan, the turning point was 
reached when the rapid expansion of labor-intensive light industry had absorbed surplus 
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domestic workers, so labor shortages occurred (Auty, 1995). This was also marked by the 
shift from manufactured products to high chemical industries since the early 1970s.  
Low investment rates explain Africa‘s overall poor growth record, but poor 
investment productivity was also a factor. For HPAEs, foreign savings provided the initial 
boost to their investment (For Korea and Taiwan, initially bilateral and multilateral loans 
played a part; for Hong Kong it was transfer of funds by overseas Chinese). While foreign 
capital can initially boost to savings, it is gross domestic savings that plays a key role in 
sustaining economic growth; and any prolonged reliance on external savings ultimately 
leads to either aid fatigue (ODA case) or huge unbearable debt (private loan case) as 
experienced by SSA..  
In SSA, productivity had been a major factor affecting growth in the 1970s, but as the 
investment rate declined in the 1980s, productivity fell sharply and had a negative impact 
on growth (Table 10). Contribution of education, although lower than East Asia, has been 
similar to that of South Asia. However, the contribution of physical capital is very strong in 
East Asia than in South Asia and even negative in SSA. In respect to exports, Wood and 
Mayer (2001) and Teal (1999) argue the scarcity of skills relative to natural resources is 
consistent with the African specialization in primary exports, while the relative abundance 
of education in Asia is found to have boosted processed exports.  
Transition from ISI to ELI could be achieved because of the high savings rate in Asia 
that set into motion the growth dynamics. In turn, high growth led to high capital inflows. 
For most African countries, various strategies to attract FDIs have not succeeded insofar as 
in the absence of large domestic markets, investors are attracted mainly by the potential to 
extract low-processed products and export to industrialized countries in Europe and North 
America. Various market restrictions by OECD actually work against FDI flows into SSA. 
Such a constraint has not been met by the HPEA economies. 
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Table 10. 
Contribution of physical capital, human capital and productivity to the growth of 
output per worker, world and developing regions, 1961-2000 
 
Region 
Growth of 
output per 
worker 
Contribution of 
Physical 
capital 
Education 
factor 
productivity 
East Asia     
1961-1970 3.7 1.7 0.4 1.5 
1971-1980 4.3 2.7 0.6 0.9 
1981-1990 4.4 2.4 0.6 1.3 
1991-2000 3.4 2.3 0.5 0.5 
1961-2000 3.9 2.3 0.5 1 
South Asia     
1961-1970 2.2 1.2 0.3 0.7 
1971-1980 0.7 0.6 0.3 -0.2 
1981-1990 3.7 1 0.4 2.2 
1991-2000 2.8 1.2 0.4 1.2 
1961-2000 2.3 1 0.3 1 
Africa     
1961-1970 2.8 0.7 0.2 1.9 
1971-1980 1 1.3 0.1 -0.3 
1981-1990 -1.1 -0.1 0.4 -1.4 
1991-2000 -0.2 -0.1 0.4 -0.5 
1961-2000 0.6 0.5 0.3 -0.1 
Source: Bosworth B. and S.M. Collins (2003) and author‘s calculations 
 
3.2. Agricultural Export Diversification 
Table 11. Agriculture export performance across Africa and Asia 
      
Primary 
Commodities 
        
Processed  
Commodities     
    
  
                 
Diversification 
   
               
Diversification 
  
    In Change Growth Share  In Change Growth Share 
  2000 1996-2000 Rate % %  2000 1996-2000 Rate % % 
Africa 3.73 74 8.28 41.1  4.02 89 8.0 9.38 
 CFA zone 2.98 84 5.08 40.2  3.69 98 11.30 7.67 
 
Non-CFA 
zone 
4.19 69 9.70 41.5  4.22 84 6.50 10.29 
Asia 4.56 78 6.91 19.4  5.03 57 11.90 8.07 
 HPAEs 5.36 58 -0.40 3.6  5.49 58 2.0 4.60 
  Non-HPAEs 4.19 83 8.94 23.8  4.82 57 16.90 9.80 
Source: Ngaruko (2003) and other calculations 
Notes: - *: The scores are average rankings. The sample includes 168 countries for primary exports, and 141 
countries for processed exports.  
- ―Growth rate‖ denotes the average annual growth rate of exports expressed in US dollars between 1996 and 
2000.  
- ―Share‖ denotes the share of export products of the category in total exports.  
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Table 11 shows that agricultural export commodities, either primary or processed, are 
less diversified in sub-Saharan Africa compared with Latin America, and even less 
diversified than in Asia. Primary commodity diversification change is more favorable in 
Africa compared with Asia. 
The figures for processed commodity diversification change are the opposite: the 
increase is higher in Asia. Finally, table 6 shows that Africa‘s strategy relies on primary 
commodities relatively more than Asia, and that this will not change notably in the short 
run: not only do primary agricultural exports represent a large share of the total exports in 
Africa, but also their growth rate is low compared with that of Asia. In Africa, CFA 
countries‘ agricultural exports, either primary or processed, are less diversified than in 
non-CFA economies. Furthermore, diversification change is less favorable in CFA 
countries compared to non-CFA countries. This suggests that vis-à-vis diversification 
performance, there may be an increasing gap between CFA and non-CFA sub-regions. 
Ngaruko (2003) 
3.3. Fiscal Policies and Macroeconomic Stability   
Macroeconomic stability is critical for economic development. Marked by high 
inflation averaging 17% in 1990 and 60% in 1994, SSA (except the CFA Zone) has shown 
serious concerns regarding macroeconomic stability and fiscal policies. African inflation 
has been primarily the result of the excessive liquidity associated with high levels of 
monetary expansion and to lesser extent, the reflection of cost-push from imported inputs.  
The experience of developing countries everywhere suggests that macroeconomic 
stability is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for rapid economic growth 
(Fischer,1993). CFA countries are a case in point. No other African economies have as 
stable and transparent a macroeconomic environment as do CFA economies. In particular, 
the monetary and budgetary arrangements between these countries and France virtually 
excludes any risk of high inflation while ensuring high credibility for the monetary policy. 
Yet this has not proven to have been of much benefit in terms of agricultural export 
performance (Ngaruko, 2003) 
In the policy implementation front, contrary to Asia, despite the fact industrial policy 
was supposed to address various forms of market failure throughout Africa, the policy was 
implemented without clear identification of the sources and nature of market failure in the 
local/specific context. According to Aryeetey and Nissanke (1998), rents were distributed 
without being tied to any objective performance indicator. In reality, almost every form of 
rent, such as import licenses, allocation of foreign exchange, or subsidized credit, was 
mistakenly viewed and used as instruments for ‗political favoritism.‘ 
SSA did not invest in enhancing export performance in the 1960s and 1970s when 
many countries followed inward-looking import-substitution policies. By not investing in 
infrastructure to facilitate exports and or developing appropriate export-enhancing policies, 
the competitiveness of the marginal SSA exports became completely eroded by the early 
1980s when various countries began to undertake economic reform programs (Aryeetey 
and Nissanke, 1998). Because agriculture development was supposed to trigger the 
development take-off, it is important to take a look at the agriculture export performance of 
SSA and Asia. 
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3.4. Development Strategies and Policies 
During the 1980s and 1990s, almost all SSA countries adopted (to a greater or lesser 
extent) World Bank and IMF-sponsored Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). One of 
the most common policy reforms was trade liberalization (removal of quantitative 
restrictions, reduction of tariffs, and, less frequently, export promotion.) The other 
important areas are tax reform (including fiscal policy); reduction of public expenditure and 
the budget deficit; reform of parastatals (generally moves towards privatization); 
agricultural price and marketing liberalization (especially dismantling state marketing 
boards); financial sector liberalization and industrial deregulation (removing price 
controls); and monetary and exchange rate policy reforms.  
As implemented in SSA, some of the SAPs‘ main recommendations did not fit into the 
path followed by the successful East and South Asian economies. Both emphasize 
macroeconomic stability, and to a lesser extent, incentives for agricultural production. 
However, SAPs emphasized liberalization while South East Asian economies relied more 
on land reform, technology transfer and input subsidies (see Hayami, 1997). The largest 
difference is regarding industrial policy: SAPs do not advocate one, whereas South East 
Asian economies have tended to be interventionist (Lawrence and Thirtle, 2001). 
Underlying these appearances of similarity are differences of interpretation. The ―SAP 
view‖ is that tax rates should be relatively non-distortionary, especially with respect to 
trade (Lawrence and Thirtle, 2001). Asian economies did impose discriminatory taxes or 
non-tariff barriers on imports of certain goods, especially for infant industry purpose. 
Although the consensus has emerged that the outcomes of SAPs in SSA was a failure; 
such an outcome resulted from partial implementation and the intrinsic contradiction of the 
program itself. Because most policies implemented in Asia originated essentially either 
nationally or within the region; their implementations within efficient administrations were 
quite effective. Weak governments of SSA find themselves inundated with ―policy advice‖ 
from several sources but lacked a mechanism for sifting through the advice in order to 
make optimal choices. They were therefore likely to make the wrong policy choices 
because short-term political considerations were the main motivating factors (Aryeetey and 
Nissanke, 1998).  
The absorption-reducing effects of both fiscal and monetary policies in SAPs not only 
reduce public capital spending, but indirectly and directly reduce private investment 
through interest rate rises and the complementariness between public and private 
investment. Current SAPs, by their heavy emphasis on massive devaluations, tend also to 
induce a deflationary spiral, which bears a negative relationship to private investment. In 
fact, experience confirms that such devaluations can themselves be the cause of 
macroeconomic uncertainty. (Elbadawi et al., 1992). 
3.5. State Interventions 
Despite the evident policy failure in SSA, both African and Asian governments played a 
central role in the course of national development by designing strategies and supporting 
priority sectors. For instance, it was selective governmental interventions in support of 
particular forms of non-traditional exporting activities (including those aimed at 
encouraging foreign direct investment into specific sectors) that were the key to the success 
of the HPAEs. In contrast, African governments have typically not developed strong 
supply-side supports—neither general nor selective—to encourage investment in 
non-traditional commodities comparable to those used in Asia. Even when this was the case, 
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for instance with export processing zones, these policies largely failed to boost 
non-traditional exports in Africa (Helleiner, 2002). 
The East-Asian governments undertook deliberate interventions in the area of industrial, 
trade and investment policies. They used both import-substitution and export-promotion 
policies to build competitive advantages first in labor intensive, then in more capital 
intensive sectors, to strengthen local production capabilities and attain international 
competitiveness (World Bank, 1993). In contrast, African countries with either passive or 
no industrial policies were reduced to activities based on natural resources and cheap labor 
that do not provide a basis for growth once these inherited advantages are exhausted (Lall 
ed, 1999).  
According to Roemer (1994), the economic strategies of Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand (and their East Asian predecessors) contained four common elements: (1) 
exchange rates were managed to provide constant and rewarding incentives to exporters; 
(2) budget deficits were kept small in relation to GNP; (3) exporters had access to inputs 
and could sell outputs at world market prices despite protection for home-oriented 
industries; and (4) labor and credit markets were flexible enough to allocate resources to 
rapidly growing industries.  
On the nature of instruments used by the Asian economies to achieve success, the 
World Bank (1993) argues there was no dogmatic insistence on defined and immutable 
instruments. Rather, they used multiple shifting policy instruments in pursuit of more 
straightforward economic objectives; Pragmatic flexibility (the capacity and willingness to 
change policies) in the pursuit of such objectives is as much a hallmark of the HPAEs as 
any single policy instrument. 
North (1990) defines institutions as the humanly devised constraints—both formal and 
informal—that shape human interaction, while Lewis (1965) argues that economic 
institutions are central to economic growth, followed by knowledge, capital, natural 
resources such as land and population, and government, in that precise order of importance. 
A regime with a short time horizon, anticipating it will lose power, tends to extract the 
maximum rents with an adverse effect on economic performance. Many African regimes 
fall into one of these categories, with Congo and Nigeria as examples. On the other hand, 
regimes with a long time horizon may perceive the gain of extracting a relatively low rent 
(as a share of GDP) from a growing economy for a long period. This may reasonably apply 
to Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan (Lawrence and Thirtle, 2001). 
3.6. Capital Flows 
Despite considerable reductions in trade barriers over the past decade, most African 
countries impose fairly high barriers through tariffs and export taxes or through managed 
exchange rate arrangements (Oyejide et al. 1997). Even though there has been significant 
rationalization of tariffs and the number of tariff categories, nominal average tariffs have 
not declined much in SSA, averaging 40% in the 1990s, which is not much different from 
what they were in the 1980s. In South Asia, these average 30%. Whereas the mean tariff on 
all products was 24.3% in Zimbabwe for 1990-96, it was only 9.1% in Malaysia, 13.2% in 
Indonesia, and 11.3% in the Republic of Korea. Cote d‘Ivoire has one of the lowest in SSA 
at 4.8%. 
A number of factors account for the flow into SE Asia. On the domestic front, the most 
important factor was the high economic growth achieved in the SE Asian region. This made 
investors confident. Further, the attempts to deregulate banking systems in various 
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countries made it easier for banks to tap into foreign capital markets while attracting 
non-traditional savers. Additionally, the pegged exchange rates of the various countries 
ensured that investors could easily predict returns on investments with reduced exchange 
rate risks. 
Africa‘s inability to attract private capital is derived from the fact that it has not been 
"structurally able to assimilate these large flows" (Aron, 1996). Nigeria is the largest 
recipient of FDI, but this is not diversified and mainly restricted to the extractive sector of 
the economy, as is the case in Ghana. Unlike the situation in SE Asia, the deterioration in 
the terms of trade coupled with high inflation ensured the real exchange rates appreciated 
rapidly, forcing significant macroeconomic instability. With the deterioration in national 
economic management all over SSA, aggravated balance of payments problems and fiscal 
deficits, the continent saw considerable capital flight instead. Collier and Gunning (1997) 
calculatethat African wealth owners have chosen to locate 37 % of their portfolio outside 
Africa. This share is compared to 29 % for the Middle East, 17 % for Latin America, 4 % for 
South Asia, and 3 % for East Asia. 
While capital flight represented 5–6% of private wealth per worker in Asia in 1990, it 
amounted to 40% in Africa (Collier et al., 2001). As Mbaye (2002) shows, in 1991 for 
instance, capital flight from Africa amounted to US$135 billion, five times as much as the 
total investment, 11 times as much as private investment, and 120 times as much as foreign 
investment. 
3.7. Trade Policies and Technology Assimilation 
Government industrial policy consisted of providing a package of market information, 
assistance with technology acquisition, subsidized credit, tax breaks and trade incentives 
for new firms to set up infant industries (Auty, 1995). But unlike in the African case, the 
government demands favored firms that rapidly achieved international competitiveness.  
The World Bank‘s East Asian Miracle report (1993) stressed that an important factor in 
East Asia‘s successful productivity-based catching up was openness to foreign ideas and 
technology. Governments were supposed to have encouraged improvements in 
technological performance by keeping a number of channels of international technology 
transfer open (Kim & Ma, 1997). This selectively permissive attitude toward the acquisition 
of knowledge of international best practice was a reflection of the view that the world 
market for goods and services provided an opportunity, not a threat (World Bank 1993).  
While multinational companies (MNCs) are believed to have been the most common 
channel of technological transfer in many SSA countries, multinational corporations were 
treated with a great deal of suspicion throughout the 1970s and 1980s. They were regarded 
as being exploitative, seeking cheap labor to produce goods that will only be sold in Europe 
and America, without any developmental concerns. As a result most African countries did 
not put in place adequate measures to attract new technologies via MNCs, which ultimately 
relegated SSA far behind the rest of the world in communications and knowledge 
management.  
Despite the diminishing import capacity of SSA countries, their import dependence on 
industrial production for spare parts, equipment and raw materials remains high while the 
level of food self-sufficiency is alarmingly low. Furthermore, most African countries lack 
the necessary infrastructure required by private enterprise, notably an adequate 
telecommunications network.  
RCE-WP04/06 -- 18 
In addition to the internal and some of the external influences above, the broad 
development thrust of SE Asia was influenced by a number of other quite different factors, 
the most significant one being its proximity to Japan and Japan‘s attitude towards the 
region. In contrast, Africa did not benefit from a favorable attitude as the Cold War came to 
an end. In the early 1990s, Western European trade and capital that were traditionally 
directed to Africa have been diverted to Eastern Europe. SSA became then completely 
isolated from the rest of the world.  
3.8. Social capital 
Southeast Asia's lead over SSA is not simply a response to good policies undertaken in 
the past four decades, but also reflects the international division of labor, the experience 
indigenous and non-indigenous entrepreneurs were allowed to accumulate during the 
colonial period and after, and the subsequent depth and breadth of the business networks 
and global linkages that characterize the entrepreneurs of each region (Brautigam, 1998). 
Because HPAEs are not landlocked like half of their African counterparts, the lower 
cost and greater ease of maritime trade meant that traders in Southeast Asia could develop 
business skills, be exposed to outside innovations, and accumulate significant capital much 
earlier than was possible for many in Africa. As part of this maritime mobility, waves of 
Chinese immigrants settled in Southeast Asia where they were to become significant 
elements in the area's economic development.  
Entrepreneurship as well as economic development is the result of a complex cultural 
heritage. Culture relates development policy options and institutional choices to certain 
cultural antecedents that make the reason for such selections easier to understand. Lewis 
(1955) put forward the view that cultural influence is related to entrepreneurship and the 
broader issue of the sociopolitical environment for growth. Economic growth depends on 
attitudes to work, wealth, thrift, having children, invention, and adventure, with all these 
attitudes flowing from the deep springs of the human mind. Therefore, raising the total 
output requires considerable expenditure on education and other public services, a doubling 
of current capital formation, and many changes in beliefs and institutions. 
Due to high levels of illiteracy, African knowledge used to be (and still is to a lesser 
extent) profoundly dependent on signs, symbols and myths (Dzobo, 2004). This knowledge 
is extraordinarily rich, but is not very effective for modern development which requires 
more precise, definite, utilitarian, tradable and codified ―hard‖ scientific and technical 
knowledge (Arrow, 1971). It is also not very effective to induce competitive manufactured 
exportable products. The relative lack of written indigenous knowledge has made the need 
for education in SSA more critical than anywhere else. Because of its inadequate 
educational system, African culture has not adjusted to different development policies 
implemented after independence. For instance, SAPs and subsequent trade liberalization 
required innovation and a technological mindset that was not yet present. Trade 
liberalization and privatization without the productive capacity enhancement of the private 
sector have resulted in the rapid marginalization of SSA. 
3.9. International environment and inter-dependence 
The developmental potential of the East Asian economies was also magnified by the 
preferential treatment the United States accorded its East Asian allies in the early stages of 
the Cold War. Similarly, the Cold War and oil crises in the 1970s were respectively the 
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major geo-political and economic considerations that influenced SSA‘s performance in 
global trade. 
Table 12 illustrates the mutually counter-cyclical oscillations of economic growth in 
various regions using percentage changes in GNP per capita as a proportion of world GNP 
per capita for select sub-periods. In 1975-90, a sharp bifurcation developed between the 
deteriorating performance of SSA, Latin America, and to a lesser extent the Middle East 
and North Africa on the one hand, and the improving performance of East and South Asia 
on the other (see Table 12).  
Table 12. 
Percentage change in GNP per capita 
as a proportion of world GNP per capita 
 1960-75 1975-90 1990-99 1960-99 
SS Africa -5 -33 -17 -47 
Latin America 3 -19 2 -15 
M.E. & N. Africa 13 3 -6 10 
South Asia -17 20 17 17 
East Asia 29 89 47 257 
North America -26 44 4 10 
Western Europe 27 -1 1 27 
Australia 11 -15 13 5 
Japan 90 34 -2 150 
Industrial World 15 16 1 35 
Source: Arrighi (2002) 
The mid-1970s ended with deterioration in North American economic growth. Among 
other corrective measures, the US government began resorting to restrictive monetary 
policies—a drastic contraction in money supply, higher interest rates, lower taxes for the 
wealthy, and virtually unrestricted freedom of action for MNES. Through this battery of 
policies, the U.S. government started to compete aggressively for capital worldwide to 
finance a growing trade and current account deficit in its own balance of payments, thereby 
provoking a sharp increase in real interest rates worldwide—and a major reversal in the 
direction of global capital flows. 
Figure 3. 
Percentage changes in GDP as a proportion of global GDP:
Asia and Africa
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The redirection of capital flows to the United States reflected both effective demand 
and investment in North America, while deflating it in the rest of the world. These 
contrasting effects tended to split world regions into two groups. On the one hand, there 
were those that for historical and geographical reasons had a strong advantage in competing 
for a share of the expanding North American demand for cheap industrial products. This 
was the case of the Asian economies. On the other, there were regions that for historical 
and geographical reasons were particularly disadvantaged in competing for their share of 
the North American demand. These areas tended to run into balance-of-payment difficulties 
that put them into the hopeless position of having to compete directly with the United 
States in world financial markets. This has been the case of SSA. 
IV. Economic development patterns and perspectives 
As recently as the 1960s, countries in the two regions adopted similar development 
strategies. Most obviously, Taiwan, South Korea, Nigeria, and Ghana all focused their 
efforts on the domestic manufacture of basic labor-intensive commodities. However, by the 
end of the 1960s, approaches to development began to diverge.  
East Asian economies moved to primary Export Led Industrialization, or ELI, 
immediately after mastering the technologies needed for primary ISI, while African 
countries kept to ISI fearing that ELI would mean reinforcing the neo-colonial system. This 
is where significant differences emerged between East Asian and African countries. The 
African countries incurred massive debt while the East Asian economies benefited from 
significant trade surpluses.  
No single factor can explain the HPAEs‘ development success or the SSA‘s 
development failure. However, it is interesting to observe that Asian development strategies 
have been consistent with available resources (natural, human and cultural), locally 
designed and constantly adjusted to international changes. The search for consistency can 
be seen by the sense of pragmatism of Asian governments even during the Cold War era. 
On the contrary, SSA has not really tried sound development strategies. Its policies have 
been unstable, inward-looking and generally counterproductive. The continuous shift in 
externally designed development strategies has resulted in policies that lack consistency 
and are marked by too frequent instances of policy reversal. These inconsistent policies in 
turn have neglected technological innovation in the growth process. 
For conceptual purposes, the development patterns of the two regions are termed as a 
―consistent open development model‖ to describe Asia‘s pattern, and ―inconsistent open 
development model‖ to describe the SSA‘s pattern.  
Table 13. Conceptual Development patterns in Asia and SSA 
Self-consistent model: Asia  Inconsistent model: SSA 
ISI Economic growth 
Trade policies (discretionary tax) 
ISI (structural change) 
ELI SAP (non-discretionary tax) 
Internal & external Savings External  
Locally featured Education Colonial education 
Technocratic & pragmatic  (rent 
creating) 
Institutions & bureaucracy 
Ideological, state intervention (rent 
seeking)  
Manageable debt, fiscal discipline Macroeconomic stability Inflation, budget deficit, huge debt 
Favorable International context Unfavorable 
Technology & innovation 
oriented 
Cultural factors 
Inappropriate to implemented 
policies and production structure 
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Starting with ISI, HPAEs soon turned to ELI as the then-industrialized economies 
provided considerable opportunities. They were able to engineer outward-looking 
industrialization strategies while SSA was stuck to ISI until international institutions 
imposed the SAPs on them in the 1980s. The superiority of an outward-oriented regime 
over an inward-looking one has been increasingly accepted as a key component of a 
growth-enhancing development strategy. Openness to the global economy provides Asian 
nations with the potential to exploit comparative advantages and economies of scale as well 
as the opportunity for greater utilization of capacity.  
Exports provide a source of foreign exchange with which to improve productivity and 
sustained growth. This sustained economic growth in turn provided the necessary attraction 
for FDIs, which became a source of employment and encouraged technological upgrading. 
External loans were soon replaced by internally mobilized savings, which combined with 
FDIs stimulated increased efficiency that led to a successful economic structural change. 
Openness also enabled global technical change to increase domestic productivity via 
importing. This could be achieved only if given an appropriate education system and 
supportive institutions. Fiscal discipline ensured macroeconomic stability and lowered 
country risk perception, which facilitated long-term projections and investor confidence.  
The internal stability that resulted from the coherent approach taken by HPAEs made it 
easy for bureaucrats to concentrate on rent creation through a mix of selective protection, 
controls over interest rates and credit allocation, managed competition (including 
encouragement of mergers), coordination of capacity expansion, restrictions on entry into 
specific industries, screening of technology acquisition, and promotion of cartels for 
specific purposes such as exports. The resulting strong performance seems to have been 
based on macroeconomic stability and high savings and investment combined with rapid 
factor accumulation, productivity growth, and equitable income distribution. 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, most African states used generous flows of foreign aid 
and gains from favorable export trade, but failed to promote domestic savings. After the 
1973 oil crisis, SSA countries initially responded to the oil price shocks in one of two ways. 
Treating the situation as a temporary terms-of-trade shock, some borrowed from the 
international capital markets to support their balance of payments right from the beginning. 
For a larger group however, the initial response to the shock was to run down their reserves. 
Balassa (1982) has shown in studies of several developing countries that those countries 
that borrowed early and adjusted their export volumes and exchange rates appropriately 
were better able to deal with the shock in terms of its overall impact on balance of 
payments. For Asian countries, the competitiveness of their exports permitted these 
countries to comfortably repay their foreign debt after the 1982 debt crisis (Auty, 1995). 
Neoclassical theories strongly suggest state intervention in the economy distorts the 
natural pursuit of comparative advantage and inevitably results in less than optimal 
outcomes. In this line of argument, SSA has often been known for the disruptive character 
of its public interventions. However, the Asian development experience has been marked 
by government interventions systematically applied to address market failures, which has 
now even been admitted by the World Bank (1993). In the final account, it appears 
government interventions per se could not lead to development failure, but the quality of 
the intervention (such as rent seeking or creation) might be the determining factor. Unlike 
the African case, in Asia rent creation through protection was linked to export performance. 
Most of the fiscal instruments and rent creations were focused in a deliberate, concerted 
way on specific industries at particular moments in time—they did not just reallocate given 
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resources across various sectors, but made a significant addition to the overall rate of 
accumulation. In SSA, rent seeking has resulted in clientelism and inappropriate spending. 
For instance, in Nigeria, oil wealth has been attributed as one of the main causes of the 
pervasiveness of rent-seeking activities and corruption. 
Human capital formation was an integral component of the industrial policy designed to 
enhance the national strategy for technological development. Asian economies realized the 
prominent role which higher education could play in their catching-up strategy. As Singh 
(1995) noted, higher education especially in science and engineering was very central to the 
process whereas SSA has still maintained an educational system designed for colonial 
purposes—a system that does not care about engineering, sciences and technical training. 
Perhaps most important was the fact that unlike the African countries, Asian economies 
did have institutions that encouraged and nurtured entrepreneurial activities and technology 
adaptation. A culture based on oral transmission is short-term and spatially limited in nature 
which is also likely to be associated with a lack of understanding of what is possible in 
terms of innovation and technological improvement. For instance, rapid changes in 
technology require constant awareness not only of new developments, but also of what has 
been done in the past and what is going on in other countries (not to mention science-based 
progress, entrepreneurship and innovation mindset.)  
Is the economic development experience of Southeast Asia relevant for policy design 
by African governments? Obviously, the inference the SSA could duplicate the East Asian 
experience is largely not relevant to the extent the international context is now very 
different from the Cold War era under which HPAEs started their take-offs. Moreover, the 
developed countries‘ market is now hermetically closed and international trade rules have 
changed. Over the years, developing countries used GATT Article XVIII, which allowed 
promotion of infant industries. Developing countries were then free to implement trade 
policies of their choice at home while benefiting from the openness of industrial markets. 
This was the regime during much of the period of Asian ascendancy.  
With the shift of GATT‘s earlier narrow focus on tariffs to a broad agreement on rules, 
African countries will find it increasingly difficult to enjoy the exemptions. In addition, 
HPAEs did not industrialize by having the Bretton Woods‘ institutions literally in control 
of their economic policy-making process as SSA is today. Furthermore, cultural assets and 
an educational system designed with engineering and technical emphasis are just some of 
necessary triggers that helped put in motion the capital accumulation, macroeconomic 
stability, entrepreneurship spirit, and export dynamism that ultimately led to the East Asian 
―miracle.‖  
V. Perspectives 
The present paper aimed at comparing Asian (mainly the high-performing economies) 
and African economies to illuminate the patterns of economic development as they 
developed since the 1960s. The discussion has pointed to strong physical and human 
capital accumulation as well as pro-export policies, international favorable attitudes, and 
cultural assets as the main reasons behind the HPAEs‘ successful development. Quite the 
opposite, SSA has found itself trapped in economic stagnation since the mid-1970s which 
has culminated in steadily declining living standards. 
Other indicators show the extent of the Asian–African divergence, especially in 
agriculture productivity, manufacturing growth and exports, as well as in human capital 
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indicators. Early in the 1960s, African and Asian countries adopted similar development 
strategies that later diverged. 
HPAEs engaged in a pattern we have termed a ―self-consistent development model‖ as 
opposed to the Africa pattern, the ―inconsistent development model.‖ The ―self-consistent 
development model‖ supposes a short-lived external dependence on savings, a combination 
of ISI strategies to protect infant industry, and ELI-orientation for market expansion. It also 
involves local initiative in the development process.  
The ―inconsistent development model‖ involves a long-lived dependence on foreign 
savings, a lack of economic structural change, and ultimately the presence of numerous 
contradictions and incompatibilities. The latter often also inhibits the sense of ownership 
and initiative in designing development policies.  
It has been concluded the inference that the SSA could duplicate the East Asian 
experience is largely not relevant to the extent that the international context is now very 
different from the Cold War era under which HPAEs started their take-offs, while the 
current WTO rules will not permit SSA to protect infant industries as the Asian economies 
did. Furthermore, cultural assets and educational system differences would make it quite 
difficult for SSA to emulate the Asian experience.  
Although the prospects for SSA are beyond the scope of this paper, some remarks are in 
order. First, it is important for us to acknowledge that several African governments have in 
fact made significant efforts to improve the quality of life of their citizens in recent years, 
but such efforts are still insufficient. Even in countries that have undertaken significant 
policy reforms, these have not led to the expected improvements in economic growth and 
external performance. There remain a number of constraints in Africa that policy reform 
alone will not rectify. In the end, SSA's success may depend on more non-economic lessons 
from Asia: the existence of national identity and political commitment to growth with 
equity.  
Second, a bold vision is now needed for African economic development involving a 
comprehensive reassessment of international and domestic policy approaches in order to 
translate the current situation into strong and sustained economic growth. There is also a 
need for developed countries to remove artificial barriers that limit access to their markets 
by developing countries. 
Since the 1970s, the success stories of the ―Asian Tigers‖ have made export-led growth 
stand out as a referential developmental strategy. However, despite two decades spent in 
pursuit of "openness," much of Africa continues to be bypassed by the global trends in 
trade and FDI flows. Diversification of exports is essential to avoid the adverse 
consequences of unfavorable terms of trade and to generate additional resources for 
development of an adequate infrastructure. 
The fact the need to sustain their economies triggered developing countries into the debt 
crisis in the early 1980s shows that further international collaboration and mutual 
adjustment is needed to get SSA on the growth path. In international trade, competition has 
not always been the rule. When the survival of other nations is in stake, sometimes the 
balance has been corrected through non-market means. We know now the limits of 
competition. It is not unusual to find an economy which cannot sustain competition to call 
for a negotiated trade agreement. For instance, the U.S. has been calling for a negotiated 
agreement with China on its trade deficit issue.  
Developed countries can help by guaranteeing open markets and radically transforming 
aid into the form of more technical assistance while taking longer-term perspectives. 
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Specific objectives of human resources development should concentrate on producing the 
entrepreneurial manpower that could determine the pace of industrialization and provide 
the critical capabilities required for research and development as well as for the managerial, 
scientific, technological and planning functions on which the industrial sector depends.  
Paraphrasing North (1997), now we have a good idea about what leads to successful 
development, yet we know little about how to get there, or, most importantly, how to put in 
place an institutional structure and organization resulting in desired economic change. As 
with Asia and Western nations that went through a successful development path, economic 
development involves trial and error, not just imitation. Economic development is and 
remains the reflection of a concerned people‘s mindset. Until individual initiative is taken, 
pooled together, and channeled through well-defined collective goals, the gap between SSA 
and Asia is likely to further widen.  
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